Escalating Tensions and Civilian Casualties
Since October 2025, Pakistan has conducted a series of airstrikes within Afghanistan, leading to substantial civilian casualties and damage. A particularly devastating incident occurred on March 16, 2026, when an attack on a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul resulted in the deaths of 269 civilians and injuries to 122 others, according to United Nations figures. Amnesty International, in a report issued on July 21, has urged Pakistani authorities to provide an explanation for this strike and called for an investigation into whether it constitutes a war crime.
Pakistan asserts that its military operations are directed at the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a group it accuses the Afghan Taliban government of harboring and supporting. The Afghan Taliban, however, deny these allegations, maintaining that the TTP insurgency is an internal matter for Pakistan. Despite these claims, the airstrikes have not yet resulted in the elimination of any prominent TTP leaders or commanders, prompting observers to question whether the TTP is the sole or primary driver behind Pakistan's actions.
The Domestic Roots of the TTP
The origins of the TTP are deeply embedded within Pakistan. The movement traces back to November 1994, when Sufi Mohammad initiated an armed uprising in Swat and Malakand with the aim of imposing Sharia law. Thirteen years later, Baitullah Mehsud unified various militant factions under the TTP banner. Mullah Fazlullah, Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law, subsequently led the group from 2013 until his death in a US drone strike in 2018. This lineage indicates that the TTP's foundational movement predates the Afghan Taliban.
Over the past two decades, the Pakistani military has undertaken numerous significant operations against the TTP. Nevertheless, the group has persisted, not solely due to its resilience or ideological appeal, but also partly because of Pakistan's historical distinction between what it terms 'good' and 'bad' militants. Islamabad's alleged covert support for the insurgency in Afghanistan, aimed at destabilizing the former Afghan republic, inadvertently fostered militant networks and infrastructure that also benefited the TTP.
A History of Geostrategic Maneuvers
Pakistan has frequently been accused of utilizing militant groups to further its geostrategic objectives in Afghanistan and against India. Following Afghanistan's 1978 communist coup and the subsequent Soviet invasion, Pakistan emerged as a crucial Western ally, particularly for the United States, in efforts to contain Soviet influence. During this period, Pakistan hosted Afghan opposition figures such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had sought refuge during President Mohammad Daoud Khan's rule. With US backing, Pakistan became a central hub for supporting the mujahideen.
The indigenous Afghan resistance progressively fell under the sway of Pakistan and Western-backed factions. The Pakistani military established training facilities along the Durand Line, where local communities were exposed to systematic radicalization. Thousands of madrassas were founded, literature promoting jihad was distributed, and local fighters were encouraged to join the Afghan mujahideen. Many of these individuals were later mobilized to fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against the United States and the previous Afghan government.
After the September 11 attacks, General Pervez Musharraf's Pakistani military publicly acceded to US pressure and joined the 'war on terror.' However, critics argue that Pakistan simultaneously continued to support certain militant groups deemed strategically useful. The discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, near Islamabad, where he was killed by US Navy SEALs in 2011, is often cited as evidence of this dual policy. Consequently, many analysts question Pakistan's genuine intent to eliminate the TTP and other militant networks, suggesting that Islamabad might view some groups as strategic assets, aiming to manage rather than eradicate militancy as a controlled insurgency.
From Strategic Depth to Strategic Dominance
If the TTP alone does not fully account for Pakistan's attacks on Afghanistan, then what broader objectives might Islamabad be pursuing? Pakistan has historically sought 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan, traditionally meaning the cultivation of a friendly government in Kabul to provide political and military leverage in a potential conflict with India. However, this policy appears to have evolved into a pursuit of strategic dominance, wherein Afghanistan is viewed less as a fully sovereign neighbor and more as an extension of Pakistan's security perimeter.
This perspective was recently articulated by Pakistan's former special representative for Afghanistan, Asif Durrani, who stated on social media that the Taliban's strengthening ties with India 'at the expense of Pakistan’s interests,' coupled with Afghan territory being accessible to armed groups, would constitute a Pakistani 'red line.' He offered no evidence to substantiate claims of India using Afghan territory against Pakistan. His comments underscore Islamabad's assumption that even normal diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and India pose a threat.
Historically, Afghanistan has maintained neutrality in India-Pakistan disputes, including those over Kashmir, and did not align with either side in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Yet, Pakistan seemingly expects Afghanistan to adopt its security perspective on India and restrict its foreign relations accordingly.
The Central Asian Dimension and Nationalist Concerns
Afrasiab Khattak, a former Pakistani senator and political analyst, posits that Pakistan's actions are also influenced by a Western agenda to curb Russian and Chinese influence. Khattak believes that Islamabad supported the Taliban not only to gain power in Afghanistan but also with the expectation that militancy would spill over into Central Asia. He attributes recent tensions partly to the Afghan Taliban's reluctance to facilitate such destabilization.
Khattak further suggests that Pakistan is using the TTP as a pretext for its attacks while simultaneously seeking a renewed US military presence in Afghanistan. In September 2025, then-US President Donald Trump voiced a desire to reclaim Bagram airbase, citing its strategic proximity to China. Days later, he warned of 'bad things' if Afghanistan did not return the base to the US. The following month, Pakistani strikes in Kabul and Paktika significantly intensified the conflict. Khattak argues that Islamabad ultimately seeks a counterterrorism monitoring mechanism that would grant it greater scope to intervene in Afghanistan and pursue its objectives in Central Asia and beyond.
Additionally, Khattak and other regional analysts contend that Pakistan perceives Pashtun and Baloch nationalism, rather than the Afghan Taliban or even the TTP, as a more fundamental threat. Khattak argues that the TTP weakens Pashtun nationalist movements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, leading Pakistan to effectively cede the province's southern districts to the group. Pakistani intelligence agencies have also faced accusations of employing militants to assassinate tribal elders, Pashtun nationalists, and political activists who have criticized state policies and demanded greater rights. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported nearly 1,200 tribal elders killed in North and South Waziristan between 2004 and 2014.
Instead of addressing legitimate Pashtun and Baloch grievances, authorities have often labeled those raising concerns as foreign proxies. A similar coercive logic underpins Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan. Islamabad has employed political, economic, and military pressure to compel the Afghan Taliban to conform to its wishes. Measures such as mass deportations and mistreatment of Afghan refugees, trade and transit closures, and airstrikes resulting in civilian deaths have largely failed and proven counterproductive. The approximately 2,600km Durand Line has been fenced, disrupting longstanding tribal and social connections. Closures of entry points have hampered trade and livelihoods, impacting millions in both nations. Despite these actions, militancy has escalated, with the TTP and Baloch armed groups continuing their deadly campaigns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
Addressing Internal Issues for Regional Stability
The tribal areas along the Durand Line historically served as a buffer between Afghanistan and British India, and later Pakistan. These regions maintained semi-autonomy until their merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018. Decades of military operations have inflicted severe costs on local communities, including loss of life, homes, and livelihoods, exacerbating their alienation from a state many now view as an occupying force. The TTP maintains a significant operational presence within Pakistan, from which it organizes and launches attacks.
The conditions in the tribal areas and Balochistan increasingly mirror the final years of the former Afghan republic, when the Taliban controlled extensive parts of southern and western Afghanistan while governmental authority was largely confined to provincial and district centers. Rather than attributing blame to external factors, Pakistan must re-evaluate its ineffective military strategy and address its domestic crises through political engagement and dialogue. Armed groups continue to control territory, possess manpower, and garner some local support, while the suffering endured by tribal communities fuels resentment and aids TTP recruitment. Further military interventions against Afghanistan are likely to deepen regional instability, empower non-state armed groups, and carry severe long-term repercussions for Pakistan itself.
